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In this work, we present a reliable, efficient,
and tight numerical method for calculating key
rates for finite-dimensional quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) protocols. We illustrate our ap-
proach by finding higher key rates than those
previously reported in the literature for sev-
eral interesting scenarios (e.g., the Trojan-horse
attack and the phase-coherent BB84 protocol).
Our method will ultimately improve our ability
to automate key rate calculations and, hence,
to develop a user-friendly software package that
could be used widely by QKD researchers.
1 Introduction
The possibility of large-scale quantum computers in the
near future has spawned the field of quantum-safe cryp-
tography [1]. This includes classical techniques based on
computational hardness as well as information-theoretic
approaches via physical assumptions. The latter in-
vokes either assumptions about the physical channel
[2], or less restrictive, the assumption only that the
laws of quantum physics are correct, which is the basis
for quantum key distribution (QKD). See Ref. [3] for
a review of QKD and Ref. [4] for an update of recent
progress. Both classical methods and QKD will likely
play a role in quantum-safe cryptographic implementa-
tions.
The maturity of QKD technology is evidenced by a
recent QKD satellite launch [5] as well as developments
of fiber-based networks [6–8], suggesting that global net-
works are on the horizon. Still, there remains important
open problems in QKD theory, such as (1) optimizing
the practicality of QKD protocols to make them eas-
ily implementable, and (2) understanding the effects of
device imperfections and side channels.
Solving these problems requires a robust theoretical
method for evaluating a QKD protocol’s performance,
which involves a detailed security analysis. Performance
is then quantified by the key rate - the number of bits
of secret key obtained per exchange of quantum signal.
Unfortunately, analytical methods for calculating the
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key rate are highly technical, are often limited in scope
to particular protocols, and invoke inequalities that in-
troduce looseness into the calculation.
We therefore focus our efforts on numerical methods,
which are inherently more robust to both device im-
perfections and changes in protocol structure. Further-
more, numerics can be made user-friendly, such that
the user needs only to define the specifications of the
protocol and then the computer performs the key rate
calculation. As an example, our group recently released
a software package for this purpose.1
The key rate calculation involves minimizing a convex
function over all eavesdropping attacks that are consis-
tent with the experimental data [9–12]. When employ-
ing numerics, one issue that arises is the efficiency of
this optimization. This issue is particularly important
for high-dimensional QKD protocols, or protocols with
many signal states, since the relevant optimization in-
volves many parameters. In such cases, the computa-
tional time can be very long - sometimes days - so it is
crucial to implement a high efficiency algorithm.
Another issue with numerics is reliability. This is
more subtle but also more important than the efficiency
issue. Due to the inherent paranoia in cryptography, it
is natural to ask whether numerically calculated key
rates are trustworthy. After all, computers have finite
numerical precision. Furthermore, optimization algo-
rithms never truly reach the global optimum, as termi-
nation conditions always have some non-zero tolerance.
Since QKD is now a serious, real-world technology, key
rates must come with a security guarantee, and hand-
waving at these numerical issues will not suffice.
In this work, we present a numerical method that
solves both the reliability and efficiency issues. Our
method provides reliable lower bounds on the key rate
with arbitrary tightness for finite-dimensional QKD
protocols. Furthermore it is highly efficient and typi-
cally returns a key rate within seconds or less on one’s
personal computer. To illustrate our method, we apply
it to three practically interesting scenarios. Namely we
consider the Trojan-horse attack [13–15], the BB84 pro-
tocol with phase-coherent signal states [16, 17], and the
1This software can be downloaded from the website:
https://lutkenhausgroup.wordpress.com/qkd-software/.
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BB84 protocol with detector efficiency mismatch [18].
We improve upon literature key rates in all three cases.
Directly calculating the key rate involves a minimiza-
tion problem (see Sec. 2). When solving this on a com-
puter, the algorithm will terminate before reaching the
global optimum and hence will return an upper bound
on the true key rate. However, we are interested in reli-
able lower bounds, i.e., achievable key rates. In previous
work [19], we noted this issue as motivation for trans-
forming the optimization problem to the so-called dual
problem [20]. This transforms the minimization prob-
lem into a maximization problem. Therefore, the dual
problem will return a lower bound on the key rate, as
desired. This method led to novel insights for particular
protocols as discussed in [19]. However, in order to sim-
plify the optimization in the dual problem, we invoked
an inequality that in some cases introduces looseness
into the key rate and, furthermore, makes the optimiza-
tion problem non-convex. Ultimately the non-convexity
reduces the efficiency of this approach, making it diffi-
cult to apply to protocols with large numbers of signal
states.
We therefore present a method here that retains the
efficiency of convex optimization, but also has the reli-
ability of the dual problem. Our approach is to break
up the calculation into two steps. The first step ap-
proximately minimizes the convex function, and hence
finds an eavesdropping attack that is close to optimal.
The second step takes this approximately optimal at-
tack and converts it into a lower bound on the key rate.
Breaking it up into these two steps adds flexibility to
our method, in that any algorithm can be employed for
the initial minimization of the convex function.
Our main technical result is to provide a recipe for
performing the second step, i.e., for converting a near-
optimal attack into a tight lower bound on the key rate.
At the technical level, we derive our main result first
by linearizing the problem and then by transforming to
the dual problem of the subsequent linearized problem.
The idea is that, for a convex function, any lineariza-
tion (about any point) will undercut (and hence lower
bound) the curve. One obtains the tightest lower bound
by this method if one linearizes about a point corre-
sponding to the global minimum of the convex function.
We emphasize several differences between this work
and Ref. [19]. Our method presented herein is tight, es-
sentially giving the optimal key rate, whereas Ref. [19]
invoked the Golden-Thompson inequality which for cer-
tain protocols introduces looseness into the calculated
key rates. This difference can be seen below in our
Figures 3, 4, and 5, which show a clear gap between
our key rates and those computed from the method in
Ref. [19]. Another difference, as noted earlier, is the
lack of convexity of the method in Ref. [19]. For a
small number of optimization parameters, e.g., as en-
countered with entanglement-based QKD protocols, the
non-convex method in Ref. [19] works quite well. On
the other hand, for the method in Ref. [19], prepare-
and-measure QKD protocols require adding a number of
optimization parameters that scale quadradically in the
number of signal states, as we need to describe the pair-
wise quantum-mechanical overlaps between the signals
(see Ref. [19] and the discussion below around Eq. (38)),
which can lead to long computation times. In contrast,
the convexity of the method presented herein leads to
more efficient scaling of the computation time with the
number of signal states for prepare-and-measure QKD,
despite the larger amount of open parameters of this
method.
In what follows we first give background on key rate
calculations in the next section. Then we present our
main result in Sec. 3. In Sec. 4 we describe how our
approach applies to a general class of QKD protocols.
We illustrate our method for three interesting example
protocols in Sec. 5, and finally we conclude in Sec. 6.
Technical details can be found in the Appendix.
2 Background
The well-known asymptotic key rate formula [21] is
given by the difference of two information-theoretic
quantities associated, respectively, with privacy amplifi-
cation (PA) and error correction (EC). These two terms
appear in the following expression for the key rate per
signal
K = ppass
(
min
ρ∈S
f̂(ρ)− leakECobs
)
(1)
=
(
min
ρ∈S
f(ρ)
)
− ppass · leakECobs . (2)
We explain this expression in more detail in Sec. 4. For
now, we note that ppass refers to the probability for
passing the post-selection (e.g., sifting) in the protocol,
leakECobs denotes the number of bits of information (per
signal that passed post-selection) that Alice publicly re-
veals during error correction, and f(ρ) = ppass · f̂(ρ) is
a function defined below in Eq. (5).
The first term in (1) is the PA term. Here, ρ is
the density operator shared by Alice, Bob, and pos-
sibly other parties involved in the protocol. (Note
that prepare-and-measure protocols can be recast as
entanglement-based protocols and are described by
same mathematics, see Sec. 4 for elaboration.) We as-
sume that the state has an i.i.d. (independent, identi-
cally distributed) structure, and hence it makes sense
to discuss the state ρ associated with a single round
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of quantum communication. This i.i.d. structure corre-
sponds to Eve doing a so-called collective attack. How-
ever, the security of our derived asymptotic key rate
also holds against the most general attacks (coherent
attacks) if one imposes that the protocol involves a ran-
dom permutation of the rounds (a symmetrization step)
such that the Quantum de Finetti theorem [9, 22] ap-
plies.
The density operator ρ is unknown, but the asymp-
totic experimental data gives linear constraints on it, of
the form
Tr(Γiρ) = γi, ∀i , (3)
where the Γi are Hermitian operators. Let S denote the
set of states that satisfy these constraints
S = {ρ ∈ H+ | Tr(Γiρ) = γi,∀i} , (4)
where H+ is the set of positive semidefinite operators.
Also, we add the identity to the set {Γi} to enforce that
Tr(ρ) = 1, giving a total of n constraints.
The key rate calculation is an optimization problem,
since we must consider the worst-case scenario (the most
powerful eavesdropping attack) that is consistent with
the experimental data. Hence Eq. (1) involves minimiz-
ing over all ρ ∈ S. Note that the error correction term
is exactly determined by the observations, and hence
we can pull it out of the optimization in (2). Similarly,
ppass is known from the observations and is pulled into
the optimization in (2).
As discussed in Sec. 4, f(ρ) can be written as
f(ρ) = D( G(ρ)||Z(G(ρ)) ) , (5)
where D(σ||τ) := Tr(σ log σ)−Tr(σ log τ) is the relative
entropy, G is a completely positive (CP) map, and Z
is a completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) map,
more specifically a pinching quantum channel. (Sec. 4
discusses the meaning of G and Z, which are respec-
tively related to the post-selection and the key map of
the QKD protocol). Due to the joint convexity of the
relative entropy and the fact that G and Z are linear
maps, the function f(ρ) is convex in ρ. Furthermore
the problem
α := min
ρ∈S
f(ρ) (6)
is a convex optimization problem since the set S is con-
vex (see, e.g., Ref. [20]). While efficient numerical meth-
ods are known for such convex problems, the key rate
calculation is unique compared to other convex prob-
lems, in that getting “close” to the optimal point is not
good enough. One needs a reliable lower bound on the
key rate, i.e., guaranteed security.
3 Main result
3.1 Reliable lower bound
We now show how to lower bound the minimization
problem in (6). Our strategy is to break up the key
rate calculation into two steps:
• Step 1: Find an eavesdropping attack that is close
to optimal, which gives an upper bound on the key
rate.
• Step 2: Convert this upper bound to a lower bound
on the key rate.
With our approach, Step 1 does not need to be perfect
- any eavesdropping attack may be used as an input for
Step 2. However, if Step 1 returns the optimal attack,
our lower bound calculated by Step 2 will be tight. Fur-
thermore, our method for Step 2 is continuous around
the optimal attack. Thus, finding a near-optimal attack
produces a near-optimal lower bound.
Step 1 may be solved in various ways using convex
optimization methods [20]. For concreteness, Sec. 3.5
presents one such method, which exploits the structure
of our problem and is relatively fast.
On the other hand, our main result is a method for
performing Step 2. We approach Step 2 via a sequence
of theorems that successively improve the reliability
and robustness of the lower bounds which they return.
First, Theorem 1 presents the conceptual foundation
for our lower bounding method. However, this theorem
is stated under a restrictive assumption that may not
hold in special cases. Therefore, we extend our result in
Theorem 2. Finally, we improve our result once more in
Theorem 3, which addresses numerical imprecision and
is directly useful for numerical key rate calculations.
Sec. 3.4 presents the argument that our method yields
arbitrarily tight bounds on the key rate.
We now present our main result in its simplest con-
ceptual form. To state this result, we first define the
gradient of f at point ρ, whose representation in the
standard basis {|j〉} is
∇f(ρ) :=
∑
j,k
djk|j〉〈k|, with djk := ∂f(σ)
∂σjk
∣∣∣∣∣
σ=ρ
(7)
and σjk := 〈j|σ|k〉.
Theorem 1: Given any ρ ∈ S, if ∇f(ρ) exists, then
α > β(ρ) , (8)
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Figure 1: Illustration of our lower-bounding method. Step 1 is
any algorithm that takes an initial feasible point ρ0 and outputs
another feasible point ρ, which may or may not be close to the
optimal attack ρ∗. Note that f(ρ) provides an upper bound on
f(ρ∗) and, hence, on the key rate. Step 2 converts this into a
lower bound, by solving the dual problem of the linearization of
f about point ρ. Since the linearization undercuts the curve f
and since the dual problem is a maximization, our lower bound
is reliable even if the numerical calculation does not reach the
global optimum.
where α was defined in (6) and
β(σ) := f(σ)− Tr(σT∇f(σ)) + max
~y∈S∗(σ)
~γ · ~y , (9)
S∗(σ) :=
{
~y ∈ Rn |
∑
i
yiΓTi 6 ∇f(σ)
}
. (10)
Here, the transpose T is taken in the same basis as that
used to define the gradient in (7), and ~γ = {γi} is the
vector of expectation values from (3), which is of size n
(the total number of constraints). Furthermore, equal-
ity in (8) holds if f(ρ) = α, i.e., if ρ corresponds to an
optimal attack.
The proof is given in Appendix A. It involves lin-
earizing the convex function f about point ρ and then
transforming the subsequent linearized problem to its
dual problem (see [20] for discussion of duality).
Figure 1 illustrates the basic idea of Theorem 1. The-
orem 1 takes any feasible eavesdropping attack ρ, which
gives an upper bound f(ρ) on α, and converts it into a
reliable lower bound on α. The fact that (9) involves
a maximization is crucial for the reliability of the cal-
culation. Since maximization involves approaching the
solution from below, every number that the computer
outputs is a lower bound on α, even if the computer
does not reach the global maximum.
3.2 A more robust bound
The assumption that ∇f exists over the entirety of S
does not necessarily hold. In particular, the gradient
has the form
[∇f(ρ)]T = G†(log G(ρ))− G†(logZ(G(ρ))) , (11)
which is derived using rules for derivatives of matrix
traces [23]. (For example, the derivative of Tr(G(X))
is g(X)T where g(·) is the scalar derivative of G(·).)
By inspection, we see that if G(ρ) is singular (i.e., not
full rank), ∇f(ρ) may not exist, and hence Theorem 1
would not apply. Ideally we would like a bound that
holds for all ρ ∈ S. Towards this end, it is helpful to
introduce a slight perturbation that maps G(ρ) to its
interior, i.e., points on the boundary become interior
points. The key fact that makes this perturbation use-
ful is that we can upper bound the difference between
the function f evaluated on the perturbed and unper-
turbed inputs, and this ultimately leads to our result
in Theorem 2 below. We introduce this perturbation as
follows.
Let  be such that 0 <  < 1, and consider a per-
turbed channel
G(ρ) := (D ◦ G)(ρ) (12)
where D is the depolarizing channel,
D(ρ) = (1− )ρ+  τ (13)
where τ = 1/d′ is the maximally mixed state. Here (and
for future reference) we define d and d′, respectively, to
be the dimension of ρ and G(ρ). Furthermore, we define
a perturbed function
f(ρ) := D(G(ρ)||Z(G(ρ))) , (14)
which is just (5) with G replaced by G. The key point
is the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The gradient ∇f(ρ), which is given by
[∇f(ρ)]T = G† (log G(ρ))− G† (logZ(G(ρ))) , (15)
always exists for all ρ > 0.
As elaborated in Appendix B, Lemma 1 follows from
the fact that G(ρ) > 0 and similarly Z(G(ρ)) > 0.
Hence the logarithm of these two matrices in (15) is
well-defined.
The above lemma motivates the following theorem,
which is a more robust version of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2: Let ρ ∈ S, where ρ is d × d and G(ρ) is
d′ × d′. Let  ∈ R. If 0 <  6 1/[e(d′ − 1)], where e is
the base of the natural logarithm, then
α > β(ρ)− ζ (16)
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where
β(σ) := f(σ)− Tr(σT∇f(σ)) + max
~y∈S∗ (σ)
~γ · ~y , (17)
S∗ (σ) :=
{
~y ∈ Rn |
∑
i
yiΓTi 6 ∇f(σ)
}
, (18)
ζ := 2(d′ − 1) log d
′
(d′ − 1) . (19)
The proof is given in Appendix C.3. The basic idea
of Theorem 2 is that it is essentially just Theorem 1,
but applied to a slightly perturbed function f. Alter-
natively, one can think of Theorem 2 as being Theo-
rem 1 applied to a perturbed state, G(ρ) instead of
G(ρ), where the perturbation maps states on the bound-
ary to the interior.
Note that Theorem 2 generalizes Theorem 1, since we
have that
lim
→0+
β(ρ)− ζ = β(ρ) , (20)
assuming that ∇f(ρ) exists. However, Theorem 2 is
more robust than Theorem 1, because it holds for any
ρ ∈ S, even if ∇f(ρ) does not exist.
3.3 Finite precision computation
Finding a lower bound with our method requires a com-
puter program for any nontrivial QKD protocol. The
finite precision inherent to computational methods in-
troduces errors that threaten the reliability of the cal-
culated lower bounds.
With this threat in mind, we identify all possible
sources of errors in evaluating Theorem 1. First, the
variables will not be precise: ρ will not exactly satisfy
the constraints, and {Γi} and {γi} will not be exact.
Second, function evaluations will not be precise: every
function evaluation introduces errors.
The aforementioned errors fall into broader cate-
gories. Variable imprecision is implementation inde-
pendent since we can characterize the imprecision in
a universal manner. Function-evaluation imprecision is
implementation dependent since in general, its charac-
terization varies widely with the particular algorithm
(particularly for evaluating nontrivial functions such as
the matrix logarithm appearing in our objective func-
tion). Since the latter kind of errors depend on the
implementation, a universal treatment of them is not
possible. In principle, it is possible to bound the effect
of such errors for a particular implementation [24], al-
though it is beyond the scope of this article. On the
other hand, we give a full treatment of implementation-
independent errors in what follows.
From a computational perspective, it is virtually im-
possible to find an element strictly in S. Further-
more, for many problems, the computer representa-
tion {Γ˜i} and {γ˜i} do not equal {Γi} and {γi} by the
nature of their numerical construction. This lack of
strictly constraint-satisfying density matrices motivates
the need for a relaxed theorem.
We show (See Appendix D.1) that both strict set
membership and imprecise constraints can be described
by the inequalities
|Tr(Γ˜iρ)− γ˜i| 6 ′ ,∀i , (21)
where ′ > 0 is an appropriately chosen number. De-
termining ′ depends heavily on how {Γ˜i} and {γ˜i} are
constructed, so we leave out a precise analysis. In gen-
eral, given a suitable high-precision computing environ-
ment, ′ may be made arbitrarily small. (For example,
for our calculations in Sec. 5, we choose ′ < 10−12.)
The bound on the unknown constraint violations moti-
vates the introduction of a relaxed set
S˜′ :=
{
ρ ∈ H+
∣∣|Tr(Γ˜iρ)− γ˜i| 6 ′,∀i} . (22)
So long as ′ is larger than the constraint violations, the
following relation holds (See Appendix D.1):
S ⊆ S˜′ . (23)
With this new set, we now present a relaxed version of
Theorem 2, with the proof given in Appendix D.3.
Theorem 3: Let ρ ∈ S˜′ , where ρ is d× d, ′ > 0, and
0 <  6 1/[e(d′ − 1)]. Then
α > β′(ρ)− ζ (24)
where ζ was defined in (19) and
β′(σ) :=f(σ)− Tr(σT∇f(σ))
+ max
(~y,~z)∈S˜∗ (ρ)
(
~˜γ · ~y − ′
n∑
i=1
zi
)
. (25)
Here, the set S˜∗ (σ) is defined by
S˜∗ (σ) :={
(~y, ~z) ∈ (Rn,Rn) | −~z 6 ~y 6 ~z,
n∑
i=1
yiΓ˜Ti 6 ∇f(σ)
}
.
(26)
Notice that as ′ goes to zero the last term in (25)
vanishes and hence
lim
′→0+
β′(σ) = β(σ), (27)
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which implies that Theorem 3 generalizes Theorem 2.
The idea is that Theorem 3 provides a method that is
robust to constraint violation due to numerical impreci-
sion. Hence, Theorem 3 is directly useful for numerical
key rate calculations. Although it is more complicated
than Theorems 1 and 2, Theorem 3 is what we employ
in practice for our key rate calculations. For example,
the calculations presented in Sec. 5 use this theorem.
3.4 Convergence and tightness
Theorem 3 is directly useful in key rate calculations, and
as such we discuss some of its convergence properties.
In practice, Step 1 does not return a density matrix ρ∗
that minimizes f over S. Instead it finds a matrix ρ′ ∈
S˜′ that approximately minimizes f over S˜′ . Hence,
we answer the natural question of how close the lower
bound produced from ρ′ will be to α = f(ρ∗).
Note that by introducing the perturbed function f,
it follows from Lemma 1 that the lower bound produced
by Theorem 3 will be continous with respect to its ar-
gument. Thus, if ρ∗′ minimizes f over S˜′ and ρ is
close to ρ∗′ under some norm, it follows that the lower
bounds produced by applying Theorem 3 to ρ and ρ∗′
will be close. Concretely, we have
lim
ρ→ρ∗
′
β′(ρ)− ζ = β′(ρ∗′)− ζ , (28)
showing that our lower bounding method converges (i.e.
the optimal lower bound of ρ∗′ is approachable).
In Appendix E we show that the minimizer ρ∗ of f
over S and the minimizer ρ∗′ of f over S˜′ satisfy
lim
,′→0
β′(ρ∗′)− ζ = f(ρ∗) . (29)
Therefore, the lower bound produced by Theorem 3 is
tight when applied to ρ∗′ .
Combining (28) and (29), it follows that the lower
bound produced by applying Theorem 3 to ρ will be
arbitrarily close to f(ρ∗) provided that , ′ are small
and ρ is close to ρ∗′ . So provided a suitable computer
implementation, our method will produce lower bounds
on the true key rate that are arbitrarily tight.
3.5 Finding a near-optimal attack
Thus far we focused on Step 2 of the key rate calcula-
tion procedure. However, Step 1 needs to be addressed
since obtaining a reasonable lower bound from Step 2
requires a ρ ∈ S that is sufficiently close to the opti-
mal solution ρ∗. Here we present an algorithm that has
proved effective in practice.
Note that in what follows we do not distinguish be-
tween exact and inexact representations of {Γi} or {γi},
nor do we distinguish between exact and approximate
set membership. The validity of this approach is justi-
fied by observing that Step 1 is decoupled from Step 2.
Specifically, we can apply Theorem 3 to any positive
semidefinite matrix that is approximately consistent
with the constraints, and still obtain a reliable lower
bound.
By applying the Gram-Schmidt process to the origi-
nal set of observables {Γi}, we obtain a set {Γ¯i} of Her-
mitian operators that are orthogonal under the Hilbert-
Schmidt norm. The expectation value of each of these
operators is denoted
γ¯i := 〈Γ¯i〉 , (30)
for states ρ ∈ S. We extend this set to an orthonormal
basis {Γ¯i} ∪ {Ωj} for the complete Hermitian operator
space with suitable operators {Ωj}. With this basis, we
may rewrite (4) as
S =
∑
i
γ¯iΓ¯i +
∑
j
ωjΩj ∈ H+ | ~ω ∈ Rm
 , (31)
where m is the number of free parameters. This per-
spective on S divides the operator space into “fixed” and
“free” subspaces. From a practical optimization point-
of-view, the benefit of this representation is that it re-
duces the original equality constrained problem (which
is cumbersome to work with) to a constrained minimiza-
tion subject to a single semidefinite constraint.
We now adapt the Frank-Wolfe method [25] to prob-
lem (6). As discussed below, the minimization in Algo-
rithm 1 is a semidefinite program and hence is easier to
perform than the original minimization problem in (6).
Algorithm 1 Minimization algorithm for Step 1
1: Let  > 0, ρ0 ∈ S and set i = 0.
2: Compute ∆ρ := arg min∆ρ Tr
[
(∆ρ)T∇f(ρi)
]
sub-
ject to ∆ρ + ρi ∈ S, where “arg min” denotes the
argument that achieves the minimization.
3: If Tr
[
(∆ρ)T∇f(ρi)
]
<  then STOP.
4: Find λ ∈ (0, 1) that minimizes f(ρi + λ∆ρ).
5: Set ρi+1 = ρi + λ∆ρ, i← i+ 1 and go to 2.
There are two concrete reasons why adopting the sub-
space perspective, as in (31), is useful for solving Algo-
rithm 1. First, finding a ρ0 ∈ S becomes simple. We
only need to find ~ω so that
ρ0 =
∑
i
γ¯iΓ¯i +
∑
j
ωjΩj ∈ H+ . (32)
Second, ∆ρ has the form
∆ρ =
∑
j
ωjΩj . (33)
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Calculating ~ω = {ω1, ..., ωm} requires solving the stan-
dard linear semidefinite program (SDP)
~ω = arg min
~ω
∑
j
ωjTr
[
ΩTj ∇f(ρi)
]
(34)
subject to
∑
j
(ωjΩj) + ρi ∈ H+ . (35)
Problems of this form have been extensively studied
(e.g., see [20]) and efficient SDP solvers are widely avail-
able.
4 General framework for protocols
4.0.1 Prototypical protocol
Having stated our main result in abstract form, we
now connect our result to concrete QKD protocols.
Our goal is to present a framework that applies to the
known discrete-variable (DV) QKD protocols in the lit-
erature. This includes both entanglement-based (EB)
and prepare-and-measure (PM) protocols. Examples
of protocols that fall under our framework include the
BB84 [26], B92 [27], SARG [3, 28], six-state [29], and
decoy-state protocols [30]. Rather than show how our
approach applies to each of these examples, we instead
construct a generic protocol that encompasses these ex-
amples. We call this the “prototypical protocol”, shown
in Fig. 2. (In Fig. 2, the distinction between the EB and
PM scenarios is depicted by a box around the source
with a dashed outline, indicating that the source may
or may not be located inside Alice’s lab.) We will now
show how to apply our approach to this prototypical
protocol.
We remark that our framework can be easily extended
to cover protocols with a central node between Alice
and Bob, such as the MDI (measurement-device inde-
pendent) [31] and the simplified trusted node [32] pro-
tocols. We direct the reader to Ref. [19] for a discussion
of this extension.
Let us now describe the basic steps involved in our
prototypical protocol:
1. In the EB scenario, Alice and Bob each receive
a quantum signal (A and B, respectively) from a
source and they measure the signal according to the
respective POVMs PA = {PAj } and PB = {PBj },
producing the raw data. In the PM scenario, the
same mathematical description applies (via the so-
called source-replacement scheme [33, 34]) since
one can think of Alice’s prepared states as result-
ing from Alice performing a measurement PA on a
register system A.
Source 
Alice Bob 
Announce 
Key 
Post-select 
Key 
Announce 
Post-select 
Figure 2: A prototypical QKD protocol that we use to illustrate
our framework. The source sends systems A and B to Alice
and Bob, respectively. The dashed line around the source in-
dicates that it may or may not be inside of Alice’s laboratory,
respectively treating the PM and EB scenarios. Alice and Bob
respectively measure POVMs PA and PB . Then they pub-
licly announce some information related to their measurement
outcomes. These announcements are used to perform post-
selection, where some announcement outcomes are discarded.
Alice then implements a key map that maps her information
(raw data + announcements) to a key variable. Finally, Alice
leaks some information (about the result of the key map) to
Bob for error correction purposes, and then Bob forms his key.
2. Alice and Bob make a public announcement, an-
nouncing some aspect of their measurement out-
comes.
3. Alice and Bob perform post-selection based on
these announcements.
4. Alice implements a key map. The key map is
a function that maps Alice’s raw data and the
announcements to a key symbol, chosen from
{0, 1, ..., N−1} where N is the number of key sym-
bols.
5. Alice performs one-way error correction, leaking
some information to Bob, and Bob forms his key.
6. Alice performs privacy amplification, typically by
applying a random universal hash function and
then communicating the choice of hash function to
Bob.
4.0.2 Mathematical model for prototypical protocol
The quantum state shared by Alice and Bob (prior to
their measurements) can be written as ρAB . In the
worst-case scenario, Eve possesses a purification of ρAB
denoted as system E, and we assume this worst-case
scenario to be as pessimistic as possible. In the follow-
ing discussion of the protocol, we will note that Eve
obtains access to additional systems due to public an-
nouncements made by Alice and Bob. (In total, by the
end of the protocol, Eve will have access to EA˜B˜ where
A˜ and B˜ are respectively the registers that store Alice’s
and Bob’s public announcements.)
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Consider the experimental constraints on the state
ρAB . These constraints have the form:
Tr((PAj ⊗ PBk )ρAB) = pjk . (36)
For prepare-and-measure (PM) protocols, we add addi-
tional constraints, as follows. We employ the source-
replacement scheme [33, 34], which treats system A as
a register that stores the information about which state
Alice prepared. This corresponds to Alice preparing the
bipartite state
|ψ〉AA′ =
∑
i
√
pi|i〉A|φi〉A′ (37)
where {|φi〉} are the signal states and {pi} are their
associated probabilities. Eve’s attack maps system A′
to system B, producing the state ρAB . On the other
hand, system A is inaccessible to Eve, and hence
ρA = TrB(ρAB) = TrA′(|ψ〉〈ψ|AA′) (38)
is fixed, independent of Eve’s attack. To fix ρA we add
in constraints of the form
Tr((Θj ⊗ 1B)ρAB) = θj (39)
where {Θj} is a finite set of tomographically complete
observables on A. Hence, (36) and (39) together repre-
sent the constraints that Alice and Bob have on their
state.
Step 2 of the above protocol involves Alice and Bob
each making an announcement based on their measure-
ment results. In this case, it is helpful to group to-
gether the POVM elements into sets associated with
particular announcements. Let us write Alice’s POVM
as PA = {PAj } = {PA(a,αa)} and Bob’s POVM as PB =
{PBk } = {PB(b,βb)}. Here the first index denotes the an-
nouncement, and the second index denotes a particular
element associated with that announcement. Bob’s an-
nouncement is given by a quantum channel with Kraus
operators
KBb =
∑
βb
√
PB(b,βb) ⊗ |b〉B˜ ⊗ |βb〉B . (40)
We remark that KBb expands the Hilbert space by in-
troducing the registers B˜ and B, which is why the oper-
ators on these subsystems appear as kets in (40). Simi-
larly, Alice’s announcement is given by a quantum chan-
nel with Kraus operators
KAa =
∑
αa
√
PA(a,αa) ⊗ |a〉A˜ ⊗ |αa〉A . (41)
Here, A˜ and B˜ are registers that store Alice’s and Bob’s
announcements, respectively. Also, A and B are reg-
isters that store Alice’s and Bob’s measurement out-
comes, for a given announcement. So, the state after
making these announcements becomes
ρ
(2)
AA˜ABB˜B
= A(ρAB) (42)
=
∑
a,b
(KAa ⊗KBb )ρAB(KAa ⊗KBb )† , (43)
where A is a CPTP map. We remark that the form of
(42) is such that A˜ and B˜ are classical registers, mean-
ing that the purifying system has a copy of the registers.
This is the way one models a public announcement.
Step 3 is post-selection. Here, Alice and Bob select
some announcements to keep and some to discard. Let
A be the set of all announcements that are kept. Then
define the projector
Π =
∑
(a,b)∈A
|a〉〈a|
A˜
⊗ |b〉〈b|
B˜
, (44)
with identity acting on the other systems. The post-
selection is modeled by projecting with this projector
to obtain the state
ρ
(3)
AA˜ABB˜B
=
Πρ(2)
AA˜ABB˜B
Π
ppass
. (45)
where ppass = Tr(ρ˜AA˜ABB˜BΠ).
In step 4, Alice chooses a key map. A key map is a
function g whose arguments include the outcome of Al-
ice’s measurements (a, αa) and Bob’s announcement b.
The function outputs a value in {0, 1, ..., N−1} whereN
is the number of key symbols. Hence, we write the key
map as the function g(a, αa, b). We define an isometry
V that stores the key information in a register system
R, as follows
V =
∑
a,αa,b
|g(a, αa, b)〉R ⊗ |a〉〈a|A˜ ⊗ |αa〉〈αa|A ⊗ |b〉〈b|B˜ .
(46)
We first act with this isometry on the state ρ(3) in (45),
ρ
(4)
RAA˜ABB˜B
= V ρ(3)
AA˜ABB˜B
V † , (47)
which stores the key information in the standard basis
{|j〉R} on R. Then we decohere R in this basis, which
turns R into a classical register denoted ZR, giving the
final state
ρ
(5)
ZRAA˜ABB˜B
= Z
(
ρ
(4)
RAA˜ABB˜B
)
, (48)
where Z is a pinching quantum channel, whose action
is given by Z(σ) = ∑j(|j〉〈j|R ⊗ 1)σ(|j〉〈j|R ⊗ 1).
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4.0.3 Key rate
Finally, Alice performs error correction, which gives
leakECobs number of bits about the key map results to
Eve, followed by privacy amplification. This gives the
following formula for the key rate [21]:
K = ppass
[
H(ZR|EA˜B˜)ρ(5) − leakECobs
]
. (49)
Here, H(A|B)ρ = H(ρAB)−H(ρB) denotes the condi-
tional von Neumann entropy withH(σ) = −Tr(σ log σ).
Note that the first term in (49) refers to the state
ρ
(5)
ZRAA˜ABB˜B
defined in (48). Also, as noted above, E is
a purifying system of ρAB .
More precisely, the expression in (49) must be min-
imized over all density operators ρAB that satisfy the
constraints in (36) and (39). Hence we write:
K = min
ρAB∈S
(
ppassH(ZR|EA˜B˜)ρ(5)
)
− ppassleakECobs ,
(50)
where S has the general form in (4), with the constraints
given by (36) and (39).
Having now expressed the key rate in explicit form,
we can now relate (50) back to the discussion in Sec. 2.
This involves simplifying the notation. Namely, for
the constraints in (36) and (39), we rewrite them as
Tr(Γiρ) = γi, as in (3). Note that we drop the subsys-
tem labels on the state ρ = ρAB . Finally, we write the
optimization problem in (50) as
α = min
ρ∈S
f(ρ) , (51)
where
f(ρ) = ppass ·H(ZR|EA˜B˜)ρ(5) (52)
= ppass ·D
(
ρ
(4)
RAA˜ABB˜B
||ρ(5)
ZRAA˜ABB˜B
)
(53)
= D (G(ρAB)||Z(G(ρAB))) . (54)
Note that (53) removes the dependence on Eve’s system
E and is derived using Theorem 1 from [35]. Equation
(54) is derived from the previous line using the property
D(cσ||cτ) = cD(σ||τ) for any constant c > 0. Further-
more we define G such that its action on an operator σ
is given by
G(σ) = V ΠA(σ) Π V † . (55)
Note that (54) has the same form as Eq. (5). In
summary, to apply our numerical approach to a given
protocol, one formulates G via (55) and the constraints
via (36) and (39). With these objects defined, one then
applies our numerical method outlined in Sec. 3.
5 Examples
In this section we consider three practically important
scenarios that show the power of our approach. In par-
ticular, we consider (1) the BB84 protocol with detector
efficiency mismatch, (2) the Trojan-horse attack on the
BB84 protocol, and (3) the BB84 protocol with phase-
coherent signal states. Each of these three scenarios
involves a BB84-style protocol but with some “imper-
fection” accounted for (detector inefficiency, existence
of a side channel, and lack of phase randomization). For
each scenario, our approach yields significantly higher
key rates than those previously obtained in the litera-
ture. We remark that the robustness of our numerical
approach could allow us to investigate all three imper-
fections in a single protocol, although for simplicity we
consider them separately.
For illustration purposes, for the following examples
we assume that error correction is performed at the
Shannon limit. This means that the error correction
term in (50) can be written as a conditional entropy,
leakECobs = H(ZR|ZBA˜B˜)ρ(5) , (56)
with the state ρ(5) defined in (48). Here, ZB can be
viewed as the classical register that one would obtain
from measuring in the standard basis on B.
Let us briefly remark about the gaps between our up-
per and lower bounds on the key rate, where the upper
and lower bounds are respectively obtained from our
"Step 1" and "Step 2" from Sec. 3. In all of our figures
below, we only plot our lower bounds, since they are
guaranteed to be reliable. But it is worth noting that,
for the examples considered below, the gaps between our
upper and lower bounds are extremely small. Namely
we observed the gap to be ∼ 10−6 times smaller than
the key rate value. Hence for these examples our upper
and lower bounds essentially coincide. In these cases,
one can think of our Step 2 as simply verifying that
Step 1 worked well, i.e., that Step 1 found the optimal
attack. We remark that the examples considered below
are low dimensional, and it is possible that the gap be-
tween the upper and lower bounds could grow with the
number of signal states, which could cause Step 1 to be
less reliable.
For each example, further details about the con-
straints used in our calculations can be found in Ap-
pendix F.
5.1 Efficiency mismatch
Consider a polarization-encoded BB84 protocol, where
Bob actively choses his detection basis setting. In this
case, Bob’s measurement involves two detectors, D1 and
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Figure 3: Key rate for the BB84 protocol with detector effi-
ciency mismatch. Curves are shown for three values of depo-
larizing probability p (0, 0.05, 0.1). The x-axis is the efficiency
of the least efficient detector, with the other detector’s effi-
ciency being set to one.
D2, that are associated with the two polarization states
for a given basis.
In practice, it is likely that D1 and D2 have differ-
ent efficiencies, commonly referred to as efficiency mis-
match. This mismatch can be further enhanced (by
Eve) by manipulating the spatial mode of the incoming
light [36]. When efficiency mismatch is large enough,
successful hacking strategies on QKD systems have been
demonstrated [37]. Furthermore, even with a small
amount of efficiency mismatch, the security analysis of
QKD becomes difficult to perform.
This motivates the application of our numerical ap-
proach the case of detector efficiency mismatch. For
simplicity, we consider single-photon signal states, and
we assume that no multiple photons arrive at Bob’s
measurement apparatus. (Our numerical approach can
handle multi-photon signals and multi-photon detection
events; however, we leave a detailed discussion of the
general case for future work.) The single-photon case
was previously treated analytically by Fung et al. [18],
and hence it provides an opportunity to compare our
numerics to the literature.
To further simplify the analysis, we assume one of
Bob’s detectors is perfect while the other detector has
an efficiency η. This allows us to plot the key rate as a
function of η, as shown in Fig. 3. The curves are shown
for various depolarizing noise levels p, where
ρ→ (1− p)ρ+ p1/d (57)
is the depolarizing channel. (We emphasize that our
security analysis does not assume that the depolarizing
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Figure 4: Key rate vs error rate for the single-photon BB84
protocol under a Trojan-horse attack. The key rate is plotted
for different values of µout. Our numerical method improves on
our previous approach in Ref. [19], which in turn gives higher
key rates than the analytical method of Ref. [15].
channel is the actual attack; we simply use this channel
to generate artificial data for Alice and Bob.) The plot
shows that our new numerical method outperforms our
previous numerical method based on the dual problem
[19], which in turn outperforms the analytical method
from Ref. [18].
5.2 Trojan-horse attack
Consider the phase-encoded BB84 protocol. Here, Al-
ice’s light source produces a pulse that passes through
an interferometer, one arm of which applies a variable
phase θ chosen from the set {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} to encode
the information. Bob decodes this phase information
with an interferometer in his lab.
There is a simple hacking attack on this protocol that
exploits a side channel in Alice’s encoder (i.e., a channel
by which Eve can obtain additional information, beyond
the direct channel from Alice to Bob). The attack in-
volves Eve sending a bright pulse of light into Alice’s lab
[13]. Some fraction of this pulse reaches Alice’s phase
encoder and is encoded with the same information that
Alice is attempting to send to Bob. A portion of this
light is reflected back to Eve, who can then decode some
of the phase information, potentially compromising the
protocol’s security. This is called the Trojan-horse at-
tack (THA) [14], since it involves a “malicious gift” from
Eve.
For simplicity, let us restrict our attention here to the
case where Alice’s light source outputs only a single pho-
ton per signal. Following the approach of Lucamarini
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Figure 5: Key rate versus signal-state amplitude α for three
values of transmission probability - η = 1, 0.8, 0.6 - for the
Huttner et al. [16] protocol.
et al. [15], we describe Eve’s input pulse and back-
reflected pulse as coherent states denoted by |√µin〉 and
|eiθ√µout〉, respectively. Here, θ stores Alice’s phase
encoding setting, and the input and output intensities
typically satisfy µout  µin. The signal states emerging
from Alice’s source are:
|φz+〉 = |z+〉S ⊗ |+√µout〉S′ (58)
|φz−〉 = |z−〉S ⊗ | −√µout〉S′ (59)
|φx+〉 = |x+〉S ⊗ |+ i√µout〉S′ (60)
|φx−〉 = |x−〉S ⊗ | − i√µout〉S′ , (61)
where
|z±〉 := 1√2(|1〉L|0〉M ± |0〉L|1〉M ) (62)
|x±〉 := 1√2(|1〉L|0〉M ± i|0〉L|1〉M ) . (63)
Here, |n〉L (|n〉M ) is the n-photon state of the long
(short) arm of the interferometer.
Figure 4 shows the results of our numerics for the
THA. Here we plot key rate versus error rate (assuming
the z and x error rates are identical, for simplicity) for
various values of µout. The plot shows that our new
numerical method gives higher key rates than both the
analytical method from Ref. [15] as well as the numeri-
cal method from Ref. [19].
5.3 BB84 protocol with phase-coherent signal
states
Here we consider a protocol proposed by Huttner et
al. [16] and analyzed by Lo and Preskill [17]. This is a
phase-encoded BB84 protocol, but using coherent states
instead of single-photon states. This is quite practical,
since one can use attenuated laser pulses from mode-
locked lasers to generate these signal states. In addition
the protocol is practical because the experimenter does
not need to do phase randomization. So it is worth
investigating the key rate of this protocol.
The signal states prepared by Alice are [17]
|φz+〉 = |+ α〉S ⊗ |α〉S′ (64)
|φz−〉 = | − α〉S ⊗ |α〉S′ (65)
|φx+〉 = |+ iα〉S ⊗ |α〉S′ (66)
|φx−〉 = | − iα〉S ⊗ |α〉S′ (67)
where α is the amplitude of the coherent state, S is the
signal mode and S′ is the reference mode. When Bob
receives the signal, he performs a polarization measure-
ment (in one of two complementary bases), discarding
no-click events, and assigning a random bit value to
double-click events.
Lo and Preskill [17] gave an analytical lower bound on
the key rate for this protocol, as a function of transmis-
sion probability η and amplitude α. Their theoretical
curves are shown as dotted lines in Fig. 5, for several
values of η. In the same plot, we show the result of our
numerical optimization as solid lines, with the key rates
obtained from the method in Ref. [19] shown as dashed-
dotted lines. Interestingly our numerics give higher key
rates than the previous literature over the entire pa-
rameter range. This is an important result due to the
practicality of this protocol.
6 Conclusions
In conclusion, we presented a new numerical approach
for calculating key rates for QKD. For concreteness, we
name our approach the “reliable primal method” or the
“reliable primal problem”. As discussed in Sec. 3, Step 1
of our method is simply the primal optimization prob-
lem. Step 2 of our method converts the output of Step 1
(a nearly optimal eavesdropping attack) into a reliable
lower bound on the key rate. We presented an efficient
method for Step 1 in Sec. 3.5. Our main contribution is
a method for Step 2, which is presented in Theorems 1,
2, and 3.
Reliability is the most important issue with numeri-
cal key rate calculations, since key rates must come with
a security guarantee. In this work, we highlighted the
various issues associated with numerical key rate calcu-
lations, such as constraint violation and inexact variable
storage by computers. Furthermore, we showed how to
address these issues. Our most robust result, Theo-
rem 3, allows one to lower bound the key rate despite
numerical imprecision.
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We discussed that our method is arbitrarily tight in
Sec 3.4. This allowed us to make significant improve-
ments over previous literature key rates for three inter-
esting examples in Sec. 5. Furthermore, the tightness
of our approach implies that the solid curves that we
plotted in Figs. 3, 4, and 5 are essentially unbeatable,
i.e., they cannot be improved upon. Eliminating loose-
ness from key rate calculations is a major advance for
the field of QKD research.
Future applications of our work include investigating
device imperfections, side channels, multi-photon de-
tection events, decoy-state protocols with partial phase
randomization, measurement-device independent pro-
tocols, differential-phase shift protocols, and coherent
one-way protocols. Perhaps more importantly, our ap-
proach can allow researchers to explore and evaluate
novel protocol ideas that have yet to be discovered.
As noted in the Introduction, our group released a
user-friendly software for key rate calculations based on
the dual problem from Ref. [19]. Interestingly, our reli-
able primal method presented here improves on the ap-
proach of Ref. [19] in terms of both speed and tightness.
Therefore, we plan to improve our publicly-available
software in the future by incorporating the reliable pri-
mal method. We believe this software has the potential
to be used throughout the QKD community, both in
industry and academia.
Finally, we hope to extend our approach to finite-key
analysis [9, 38–40] in the near future.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
A.1 Standard form for semidefinite programs
To prove Theorem 1, we will make use of the so-called standard form for semidefinite programs (e.g., see page 265
of [20]), given as follows:
Primal Problem Dual Problem (68)
min
X
〈A,X〉 max
~y
~b · ~y
subject to: subject to:
〈B1, X〉 = b1 A > ~y · ~B
... ~y ∈ Rn
〈Bm, X〉 = bm
X > 0
Here, the inner product is of the Hilbert-Schmidt form, 〈A,B〉 := Tr(A†B), and the vector notation ~a·~b is shorthand
for
∑m
j=1 ajbj .
If µ and ν are, respectively, the solutions of the primal and dual problems, then in general one has
µ > ν , (69)
which is known as weak duality [20]. Furthermore, under certain conditions, (69) turns into an equality µ = ν,
known as strong duality. A sufficient condition for strong duality to hold is Slater’s condition (e.g., page 265 of
[20]), which can be stated as follows for the standard-form SDP in (68).
Slater’s condition: Let X = {X > 0 : 〈Bj , X〉 = bj ,∀j} be the set of feasible X for the primal problem in (68).
Suppose that X 6= ∅. Furthermore, suppose that there exists a ~y ∈ Rn such that A > ~y · ~B. Then
µ = ν . (70)
A.2 Inequality in (8)
In what follows, we first prove the inequality in (8),
α > β(ρ) , (71)
and in the next subsection we establish the equality condition.
For some matrix σ, let ~σ := vec(σ) denote the vectorization obtained by stacking the columns of σ. For two
matrices σ and τ , note that the inner product between their vectorizations can be written as
~σ · ~τ = Tr(σT τ) , (72)
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where T is the transpose taken in the basis used to define the vectorization.
Now consider the gradient matrix ∇f(ρ) defined in (7) and its vectorization ~∇f(ρ). Note that the quantity
g(ρ, σ) := (~σ − ~ρ) · ~∇f(ρ) (73)
= Tr
[
(σ − ρ)T∇f(ρ)] (74)
quantifies how much the function f changes whenever one moves from point ρ to point σ. [Note that Eq. (74)
rewrote g(ρ, σ) in matrix notation, where T is the transpose in the same basis that is used to represent the gradient
matrix.] More precisely, g(ρ, σ) quantifies how much the linearization Lρ of f changes, where Lρ is the linearization
about point ρ. Specifically, the linearization is given by
Lρ(σ) = f(ρ) + g(ρ, σ) . (75)
The assumption of Thm. 1 is that f is differentiable about the point ρ of interest. Since f is a convex, differentiable
function over a convex set S, the linearization Lρ always lies below the curve f (e.g. page 69 of [20]). Hence, for
any two points ρ, σ ∈ S we have
f(σ)− f(ρ) > g(ρ, σ) . (76)
Now let ρ∗ ∈ S minimize f over S. Then
f(ρ∗) > f(ρ) + Tr((ρ∗ − ρ)T∇f(ρ)) (77)
> f(ρ) + min
σ∈S
[
Tr((σ − ρ)T∇f(ρ))] (78)
= f(ρ)− Tr(ρT∇f(ρ)) + min
σ∈S
Tr(σT∇f(ρ)) , (79)
where (78) exploits the fact that ρ∗ ∈ S. Hence finding a lower bound on α reduces to the minimization problem
min
σ∈S
Tr(σT∇f(ρ)). (80)
This is a linear semidefinite program (SDP) and we may apply duality theory to obtain the dual SDP. In particular,
our problem is essentially the standard SDP form given in Sec. A.1, which gives the following dual problem
max
~y ∈S∗(ρ)
~γ · ~y , (81)
where
S = {ρ ∈ H+ | Tr(Γiρ) = γi,∀i} , (82)
S∗(σ) =
{
~y ∈ Rn |
∑
i
yiΓTi 6 ∇f(σ)
}
. (83)
Weak duality from (69) implies that
min
σ∈S
Tr(σT∇f(ρ)) > max
~y ∈S∗(ρ)
~γ · ~y . (84)
Inserting (84) into (79) gives the desired lower bound in (8).
A.3 Equality in (8)
With the inequality in Theorem 1 proven, we now show that equality in (8) holds if ρ satisfies f(ρ) = f(ρ∗) = α.
First, consider the inequality in (84). Slater’s condition stated in Sec. A.1 provides a sufficient criteria for strong
duality to hold and, hence, for (84) to be an equality. To satisfy this condition it is adequate to show that S 6= ∅
and there exists ~y ∈ Rn such that∑i yiΓTi < ∇f(ρ). Since the set of constraints {Γi} correspond to a valid density
matrix, it immediately follows that S 6= ∅. Since density matrices are constrained to have trace one, without loss
of generality we may take Γ1 = 1 and γ1 = 1. Thus, if λmin is the smallest eigenvalue of ∇f(ρ), it follows that
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(λmin − 1)ΓT1 < ∇f(ρ). So ~y = (λmin − 1, 0, ..., 0)T satisfies
∑
i yiΓTi < ∇f(ρ). With Slater’s condition satisfied,
strong duality holds and
min
σ∈S
Tr(σT∇f(ρ)) = max
~y ∈S∗(ρ)
~γ · ~y . (85)
We now show that if f(ρ) = f(ρ∗) then equality in (8) holds. Suppose that f(ρ) = f(ρ∗), then (79) yields
min
σ∈S
Tr((σ − ρ)T∇f(ρ)) 6 0 . (86)
Next, we state a lemma that provides a bound in the opposite direction of (86).
Lemma 2: For a point ρ that minimizes f over S,
min
σ∈S
Tr((σ − ρ)T∇f(ρ)) > 0 . (87)
Proof. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions (e.g. page 243 of [20]) provide necessary conditions for the
optimality of ρ. For our problem they say that if ρ is optimal, then there exists a pair (~λ, Z) ∈ Rn ×H where H
denotes the set of d× d Hermitian matrices such that
∇f(ρ) +
∑
i
λiΓiT − Z = 0 , (88)
Tr(ZT ρ) = 0 , (89)
Z > 0 . (90)
Let σ ∈ S then
Tr((σ − ρ)T∇f(ρ)) = Tr((σ − ρ)T (−
∑
i
λiΓiT + Z)) (91)
=
∑
i
λiTr(Γiρ)−
∑
i
λiTr(Γiσ) + Tr(ZTσ)− Tr(ZT ρ) (92)
= Tr(ZTσ) , (93)
where we have used the definition of S and (89) in the last equality. Since σ and ZT are both positive semidefinite
it follows that the trace of their product is nonnegative. Hence,
Tr((σ − ρ)T∇f(ρ)) > 0 , (94)
and since σ is arbitrary, the desired result follows.
Combining (86) and (87) we must have
min
σ∈S
Tr((σ − ρ)T∇f(ρ)) = 0 . (95)
Consequently,
f(ρ∗) = f(ρ) + min
σ∈S
Tr((σ − ρ)T∇f(ρ)) (96)
= f(ρ)− Tr(ρT∇f(ρ)) + max
~y∈S∗(ρ)
~γ · ~y (97)
= β(ρ) . (98)
B Proof of Lemma 1
As noted in (15), the gradient of interest has the form
[∇f(ρ)]T = G† (log G(ρ))− G† (logZ(G(ρ))) . (99)
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To show that this expression is well-defined, we simply need to show that logarithms can be evaluated, which would
be true if G(ρ) and Z(G(ρ)) are full-rank matrices.
Consider the first of these matrices
G(ρ) = (D ◦ G)(ρ) = (1− )G(ρ) +  1/d′ . (100)
Since G(ρ) > 0, it follows that
G(ρ) >  1/d′ > 0 . (101)
In other words, G(ρ) is full rank.
Now consider the second of these matrices
Z(G(ρ)) = (1− )Z(G(ρ)) + Z(1)/d′ (102)
= (1− )Z(G(ρ)) +  1/d′ (103)
where the second line notes that Z is a pinching quantum channel and hence Z(1) = 1. Since Z(G(ρ)) > 0, we
have
Z(G(ρ)) >  1/d′ > 0 . (104)
So both G(ρ) and Z(G(ρ)) are full rank, implying that (99) is well-defined.
C Proof of Theorem 2
C.1 Continuity in ρ
Here we state that the objective function f(ρ) is continuous, which will be useful for our proof of Theorem 2.
First we state two helpful lemmas for the trace distance (or trace norm). The first lemma was proved in Ref. [41].
Lemma 3: Let ρ > 0 and σ > 0 be positive semidefinite matrices. Then
‖ρ− σ‖21 6 (Trρ+ Trσ)2 − 4‖
√
ρ
√
σ‖21 , (105)
where ‖A‖1 = Tr
√
A†A is the trace norm.
The next lemma is a corollary of Lemma 3.
Lemma 4: Let ρ > 0 and σ > 0 be positive semidefinite matrices. Let E be a completely positive trace-nonincreasing
(CPTNI) map. Then
‖ρ− σ‖1 > ‖E(ρ)− E(σ)‖1 , (106)
where ‖A‖1 = Tr
√
A†A is the trace norm.
Proof. Let ρ− σ = Q− S, where Q > 0 and S > 0, and Q and S have orthogonal support. Hence
‖ρ− σ‖1 = ‖Q− S‖1 (107)
= TrQ+ TrS (108)
> Tr[E(Q)] + Tr[E(S)] (109)
> ‖E(Q)− E(S)‖1 (110)
= ‖E(ρ)− E(σ)‖1 . (111)
Here, (109) used the fact that E is trace-nonincreasing. Also, (110) follows directly from (105).
Next we state a lemma, known as Fannes’ inequality, that entropy is continuous. The proof can be found, e.g.,
in Ref. [42].
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Lemma 5: Let ρ > 0 and σ > 0 be n× n positive semidefinite matrices, such that ‖ρ− σ‖1 6 κ 6 1/e. Then
|H(ρ)−H(σ)| 6 κ log(n/κ) . (112)
Note that the right-hand side of (112) goes to zero as κ → 0. Finally we state the continuity of our objective
function.
Lemma 6: Let ρ and σ be (normalized) density matrices such that ‖ρ− σ‖1 6 κ 6 1/e. Let f(ρ) be defined as in
(5),
f(ρ) = D( G(ρ)||Z(G(ρ)) ) , (113)
where G is a completely positive trace-nonincreasing (CPTNI) map and Z is a pinching quantum channel. Suppose
G(ρ) and G(σ) are d′ × d′. Then
|f(ρ)− f(σ)| 6 2κ log(d′/κ) . (114)
Proof. It is straightforward to show that
f(ρ) = H [Z(G(ρ))]−H [G(ρ)] . (115)
Next note that Lemma 4 implies that ‖G(ρ)− G(σ)‖1 6 κ and ‖Z(G(ρ))−Z(G(σ))‖1 6 κ. So from (115) we have∣∣f(ρ)− f(σ)∣∣ = ∣∣∣H [Z(G(ρ))]−H [G(ρ)]−H [Z(G(σ))] +H [G(σ)] ∣∣∣ (116)
6
∣∣∣H [Z(G(ρ))]−H [Z(G(σ))] ∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣H [G(ρ)]−H [G(σ)] ∣∣∣ (117)
6 κ log(d′/κ) + κ log(d′/κ) (118)
6 2κ log(d′/κ) , (119)
where (118) invoked Lemma 5.
C.2 Continuity in 
Here we show another sort of continuity, namely, the continuity of f(ρ) in . First we need the following lemma.
Lemma 7: For any normalized density matrix ρ and any completely positive trace-nonincreasing map (CPTNI) G,
let G(ρ) = D(G(ρ)) = (1 − )G(ρ) + 1/d′. Also, let Z be a completely positive trace-preserving (CPTP) map.
Then we have
‖G(ρ)− G(ρ)‖1 6 (d′ − 1) , and (120)
‖Z(G(ρ))−Z(G(ρ))‖1 6 (d′ − 1) . (121)
Proof. Note that (121) follows from (120) due to Lemma 4. So we just need to prove (120). Towards this end, we
define
∆ := G(ρ)− G(ρ) (122)
= G(ρ)− ((1− ) ∗ G(ρ) + 1/d′) (123)
=  ∗ (G(ρ)− 1/d′) = ∆ (124)
with ∆ := G(ρ)− 1/d′. Now note that 0 6 G(ρ) 6 1, which implies
−1/d′ 6 ∆ 6 (1− 1/d′)1 (125)
Since 1/d′ 6 (1− 1/d′), we have
−(1− 1/d′)1 6 ∆ 6 (1− 1/d′)1 . (126)
This means that the d′ eigenvalues {λj} of ∆ each satisfy |λj | 6 (1− 1/d′). Hence
‖∆‖1 6 d′ − 1 . (127)
Combining (127) with (124) proves (120).
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Now we prove our desired continuity statement.
Lemma 8: Let  be such that 0 <  6 1/[e(d′ − 1)]. Let ρ be any density matrix. Then
|f(ρ)− f(ρ)| 6 ζ , (128)
where ζ := 2(d′ − 1) log d′(d′−1) .
Proof. We begin by expanding the expression of interest as follows
|f(ρ)− f(ρ)| = |H(Z(G(ρ)))−H(G(ρ)) +H(G(ρ))−H(Z(G(ρ)))| (129)
6 |H(Z(G(ρ)))−H(Z(G(ρ)))|+ |H(G(ρ))−H(G(ρ))| . (130)
Next we exploit Lemma 7 and Lemma 5. In particular, applying Lemma 5 with κ = (d′ − 1) and n = d′ gives
|H(G(ρ))−H(G(ρ))| 6 κ log(n/κ) = (d′ − 1) log d
′
(d′ − 1) (131)
|H(Z(G(ρ)))−H(Z(G(ρ)))| 6 (d′ − 1) log d
′
(d′ − 1) . (132)
Finally, we obtain
|f(ρ)− f(ρ)| 6 2(d′ − 1) log d
′
(d′ − 1) = ζ . (133)
C.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We first define a perturbed optimization problem. Let  ∈ R such that 0 <  < 1/(de). Then consider
α() := min
ρ∈S
f(ρ) (134)
where f was defined in (14) as
f(ρ) = D(G(ρ)||Z(G(ρ))) . (135)
Next we relate α() to α with the following lemma.
Lemma 9: Let  be such that 0 <  6 1/[e(d′ − 1)]. Then
|α− α()| 6 ζ , (136)
where ζ := 2(d′ − 1) log d′(d′−1) .
Proof. Note that (136) is equivalent to
−ζ 6 α− α() 6 ζ . (137)
Now let α = f(ρ∗) and α() = f(ρ∗ ), where ρ∗ ∈ S and ρ∗ ∈ S. We prove (137) in two steps. First we have
α− α() = f(ρ∗)− f(ρ∗ ) (138)
6 f(ρ∗ )− f(ρ∗ ) (139)
6 ζ . (140)
where the last line follows from Lemma 8.
Second we have
α− α() = f(ρ∗)− f(ρ∗ ) (141)
> f(ρ∗)− f(ρ∗) (142)
> −ζ . (143)
where again the last line follows from Lemma 8. Taken together, (140) and (143) give the desired result.
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Lemma 9 connects α to α(). So now we can proceed to lower bound α() to ultimately get a lower bound on α.
The key observation is that α() corresponds precisely to α provided that one makes the substitution G → G.
Since this change simply involves substituting a different quantum channel for G, the lower bound that we previously
found on α in Theorem 1 directly applies, with the appropriate substitution made. Recall that in Theorem 1 we
found that, for any ρ ∈ S such that ∇f(ρ) exists,
α > β(ρ) = f(ρ)− Tr(ρT∇f(ρ)) + max
~y∈S∗(ρ)
~γ · ~y , (144)
where
S∗(σ) :=
{
~y ∈ Rn |
∑
i
yiΓTi 6 ∇f(σ)
}
. (145)
This result can be directly applied find a similar lower bound on α(). One simply needs to substitute G for G,
which is equivalent to substituting f for f . Hence we obtain
α() > β(ρ) := f(ρ)− Tr(ρT∇f(ρ)) + max
~y∈S∗ (ρ)
~γ · ~y , (146)
where
S∗ (σ) :=
{
~y ∈ Rn |
∑
i
yiΓTi 6 ∇f(σ)
}
. (147)
It is crucial to note that, while (144) applies only if ∇f(ρ) exists, (146) applies to all ρ ∈ S since ∇f(ρ) always
exists.
Furthermore, we remark that the argument in Sec. A.3 directly applies to α(), so that we have
α() = β(ρ∗ ) (148)
where ρ∗ is a state that satisfies α() = f(ρ∗ ).
Finally, we combine (146) with Lemma 9, specifically (143). This gives the following bound for any ρ ∈ S:
α > α()− ζ (149)
> β(ρ)− ζ . (150)
D Handling numerical imprecision
D.1 Imprecise representations
As noted in the main text (Sec. 3.3), it is impossible to provide exact floating-point representations of {Γi} and
{γi}. We address this impossibility by defining approximate representations, which we denote by {Γ˜i} and {γ˜i} re-
spectively. Of course, we could define the set of states that satisfy the constraints associated with these approximate
representations:
S˜ := {ρ ∈ H+ | Tr(Γ˜iρ) = γ˜i,∀i} . (151)
But as illustrated in Fig. 6, S˜ does not coincide with the true set of interest S. To address this, we will expand the
set S˜ until it encompasses S, as the set S′ does in Fig. 6.
We begin by relating the approximate and exact representations by
Γ˜i = Γi + δΓi and γ˜i = γi + δγi , (152)
where
||δΓi||HS < 1 and |δγi| < 2 , (153)
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for all i. Here, the Hilbert-Schmidt norm is defined by ||A||HS :=
√
Tr(A†A). Determining the constants 1 and 2
is rather technical and depends heavily on how the approximate observables and expectation values are computed.
However, if the mantissa of the underlying representation is increased in length (or arbitrary precision arithmetic
is used) and appropriate numerical algorithms are applied, the approximate representations will become arbitrarily
accurate. Hence, 1 and 2 may be made as small as needed.
We define the quantity
rep := 1 + 2 , (154)
which measures our overall uncertainty in the variable representation.
We now prove a lemma that motivates our treatment of the imprecision. Namely, it allows us to upper bound
the numerical constraint violation.
Lemma 10: Let ρ ∈ S and let the definitions in (152), (153), and (154) hold. Then
|Tr(Γ˜iρ)− γ˜i| < rep . (155)
Proof. We can apply the triangle inequality, the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the fact that ρ is a density matrix
to obtain
|Tr(Γ˜iρ)− γ˜i| = |Tr(δΓiρ)− δγi| (156)
6 |Tr(δΓiρ)|+ |δγi| (157)
6 ||δΓi||HS||ρ||HS + |δγi| (158)
6 ||δΓi||HS + |δγi| (159)
< 1 + 2 . (160)
Motivated by Lemma 10, we consider the set
S˜′ :=
{
ρ ∈ H+
∣∣|Tr(Γ˜iρ)− γ˜i| < ′,∀i} , (161)
where it is clear that lim′→0 S˜′ = S˜. Furthermore, if we choose ′ = rep, we obtain the set
S˜rep ⊇ S , (162)
which follows directly from Lemma 10. Hence, S˜rep encompasses both S and S˜. So we could use S˜rep as the basis
for our optimization. However, we have not yet accounted imprecision in the numerical solver. As discussed in the
next subsection, we may need to expand S˜rep further to allow for solver imprecision.
D.2 Imprecise solvers
Up to this point in our analysis, we have neglected the fact that no numerical solver is exact. In reality, the matrix
ρ˜ returned by the solver may not be positive semidefinite or satisfy the approximate constraints defined by {Γ˜i}
and {γ˜i}. Here we present a method for addressing this situation.
First, we add a bit of the identity to ρ˜ to obtain a positive semidefinite matrix. Let λmin denote the smallest
eigenvalue of ρ˜, then
ρ˜′ :=
{
ρ˜− λmin1 , λmin < 0
ρ˜ , otherwise
(163)
is positive semidefinite.
Second, we expand the set over which we optimize such that it encompasses ρ˜′, as illustrated in Fig. 6. Let sol
be a positive real number such that
|Tr(Γ˜iρ˜′)− γ˜i| < sol (164)
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ρ˜′
ρ∗
SS˜
S˜′
Figure 6: Illustration of our method for handling numerical imprecision. Ideally we want to represent the set S in the computer.
However, since the computer has finite precision, it stores S˜ that approximates S, where S˜ is defined by (151). Furthermore, when
we attempt to optimize over S˜, the answer ρ˜′ returned by the computer may not even be in S˜. We grow S˜ into a new set S˜′ that
contains both S and ρ˜′, where S˜ is defined in (161). (Note that lim′→0 S˜′ = S˜.) With this expanded set S˜′ , we may then find
a reliable lower bound by applying the technique discussed in the main text (Sec. 3.3).
for all i. The quantity sol describes how close ρ˜′ is to satisfying the approximate constraints provided that it is
chosen to be as small as possible. The closer ρ˜′ is to satisfying the constraints, the smaller sol will be.
We now have two quantities: rep describes the representation precision and sol describes the solver precision.
We define the quantity
′ = max(rep, sol) . (165)
The reason for defining ′ is that it specifies how large of a set we need to contain both the imprecise solution
returned by the solver and the exact solution. If we can construct such a set, then we may relax both Theorem 1
and Theorem 2 to obtain the computationally feasible Theorem 3.
Recall the relaxed set of approximate density matrices defined in (161), rewritten here for convenience:
S˜′ =
{
ρ ∈ H+
∣∣|Tr(Γ˜iρ)− γ˜i| < ′,∀i} .
From Lemma 10, it follows that S ⊆ S˜′ , and (164) implies that ρ˜′ ∈ S˜′ . This is illustrated in Fig. 6.
In summary, our method for handling numerical imprecision involves minimizing the objective function f(ρ) over
S˜′ . Because S ⊆ S˜′ , our method will yield a reliable lower bound on α = minρ∈S f(ρ).
D.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Our proof strategy for Theorem 3 will be similar to that for Theorem 2, in that we will consider a slightly perturbed
optimization problem to ensure a well-defined gradient, and we will invoke continuity to argue that the perturbed
problem is close to the problem of interest. The only difference is that now the problem of interest will allow for
small violations of the constraints.
Of course, we are ultimately interested in lower bounding the quantity defined in (6),
α = min
ρ∈S
f(ρ) . (166)
But due to numerical imprecision (discussed above), we must consider a slightly different problem,
α′ := min
ρ∈S˜′
f(ρ) . (167)
where S˜′ was defined in (22). Fortunately, we have that S ⊆ S˜′ (see previous subsection), which implies that
α > α′ . (168)
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Hence, any lower bound on α′ is also a lower bound on α. So let us now find a lower bound on α′ .
As noted above, we will in fact consider a further perturbation on the optimization problem, to ensure a well-
defined gradient. Again, this is analogous to what we did in Theorem 2. This perturbed optimization problem has
the form
α′() := min
ρ∈S˜′
f(ρ) , (169)
where f was defined in (14). Suppose that ρ∗′ ∈ S˜′ achieves this optimization, i.e., α′() = f(ρ∗′). Next, we
consider any ρ ∈ S˜′ , and we invoke an argument identical to that used in Eqs. (77)-(79) to write
α′() = f(ρ∗′) > f(ρ) + Tr
[
(ρ∗′ − ρ)T∇f(ρ)
]
(170)
> f(ρ)− Tr
[
ρT∇f(ρ)
]
+ min
σ∈S˜′
Tr
[
σT∇f(ρ)
]
. (171)
Next we rewrite the minimization in (171) as a maximization via duality.
Lemma 11: Let ρ ∈ S˜′ , then
min
σ∈S˜′
Tr
[
σT∇f(ρ)
]
= max
~x∈Sˆ∗ (ρ)
~v(~˜γ, ′) · ~x . (172)
where ~v(~˜γ, ′) := (~˜γ + ′)⊕ (−~˜γ + ′) is a 2n-dimensional vector, and
Sˆ∗ (σ) :=
{
~x ∈ R2n |
n∑
i=1
xi(Γ
+
i )T +
n∑
i=1
xi+n(Γ
−
i )T 6 ∇f(σ)
}
(173)
∇f(σ) := ∇f(σ)⊕ 0⊕ 0 (174)
Γ+i := Γ˜i ⊕ i⊕ 0 (175)
Γ−i := −Γ˜i ⊕ 0⊕ i . (176)
Here, 0 is the n × n matrix of zeros, and i = |i〉〈i| is the projector onto the i-th element of the standard basis in
n-dimensions.
Proof. First we rewrite the minimization problem as
min
σ∈H
Tr(σT∇f(ρ)) (177)
s.t.Tr(Γ˜iσ) 6 γ˜i + ′
Tr(−Γ˜iσ) 6 −γ˜i + ′
σ > 0
Next, we utilize slack variables (e.g., see page 131 of [20]); the idea is to replace each inequality constraint with an
equality constraint, and a nonnegativity constraint. Letting ~a and ~b denote slack variables, the problem becomes
min
σ∈H
Tr(σT∇f(ρ)) (178)
s.t.Tr(Γ˜iσ) + ai = γ˜i + ′
Tr(−Γ˜iσ) + bi = −γ˜i + ′
σ > 0
~a,~b > 0
Next we recast the problem so that there is again one positive semidefinite variable. First we define the following
n× n diagonal matrices:
a = diag(~a), b = diag(~b), 0 = diag(~0), and i = |i〉〈i| , (179)
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where ~0 is the n-dimensional zero vector, and |i〉〈i| is the projector onto the i-th element of the standard n-
dimensional basis. Next we define the block-diagonal matrices
σ = σ ⊕ a ⊕ b (180)
∇f(ρ) = ∇f(ρ)⊕ 0⊕ 0 (181)
Γ+i = Γ˜i ⊕ i⊕ 0 (182)
Γ−i = −Γ˜i ⊕ 0⊕ i . (183)
The optimization problem then becomes
min
σ∈H
Tr
(
σT∇f(ρ)
)
(184)
s.t.Tr
(
Γ±i σ
)
= ±γ˜i + ′
σ > 0
This is a semidefinite program of a form identical to the one that appears in the proof of Theorem 1. Duality
theory, as discussed briefly in Sec. A.1, yields the dual problem
max
~x∈Sˆ∗ (ρ)
~v(~˜γ, ′) · ~x . (185)
where ~v(~˜γ, ′) := (~˜γ + ′)⊕ (−~˜γ + ′) is a 2n-dimensional vector.
Next we rewrite the optimization problem in a simpler way, as follows.
Lemma 12: Let ρ ∈ S˜′ , then
max
~x∈Sˆ∗ (ρ)
~v(~˜γ, ′) · ~x = max
(~y,~z)∈S˜∗ (ρ)
(
~˜γ · ~y − ′
n∑
i=1
zi
)
, (186)
where
S˜∗ (σ) :=
{
(~y, ~z) ∈ (Rn,Rn) | −~z 6 ~y 6 ~z,
n∑
i=1
yi(Γ˜i)T 6 ∇f(σ)
}
. (187)
Proof. First, note that we can rewrite the set Sˆ∗ (ρ) as follows
Sˆ∗ (σ) :=
{
~x ∈ R2n | ~x 6 0,
n∑
i=1
(xi − xi+n)(Γ˜i)T 6 ∇f(σ)
}
. (188)
This formula is derived by breaking up the constraints in (173) associated with different blocks. The first block
gives the constraint
n∑
i=1
(xi − xi+n)(Γ˜i)T 6 ∇f(σ). (189)
The second block gives the constraint
∑n
i xi|i〉〈i| 6 0, and the third block gives the constraint
∑n
i xi+n|i〉〈i| 6 0.
These latter two constraints imply that xi 6 0 for all i ∈ [1, 2n], or in other words, that ~x 6 0.
Next we write ~x = ~x1 ⊕ ~x2 where ~x1 ∈ Rn and ~x2 ∈ Rn. Then we define ~y := ~x1 − ~x2 and ~z := −~x1 − ~x2. With
these definitions, we rewrite the objective function as
~v(~˜γ, ′) · ~x = (~˜γ + ′) · ~x1 + (−~˜γ + ′) · ~x2 = ~˜γ · ~y − ′
n∑
i=1
zi . (190)
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Next note that we can rewrite the constraint ~x 6 0 as
−~z 6 ~y 6 ~z . (191)
Hence we can define the set
S˜∗ (σ) :=
{
(~y, ~z) ∈ (Rn,Rn) | −~z 6 ~y 6 ~z,
n∑
i=1
yi(Γ˜i)T 6 ∇f(σ)
}
, (192)
and the optimization problem becomes
max
(~y,~z)∈S˜∗ (ρ)
(
~˜γ · ~y − ′
n∑
i=1
zi
)
. (193)
Combining (171), (172), and (186) gives
α′() = f(ρ∗′) > f(ρ)− Tr
[
ρT∇f(ρ)
]
+ max
(~y,~z)∈S˜∗ (ρ)
(
~˜γ · ~y − ′
n∑
i=1
zi
)
. (194)
Next we invoke continuity from Lemma 8, as we did in the proof of Theorem 2, and we obtain the following
inequality
α′ − α′() > f(ρ∗′)− f(ρ∗′) > −ζ . (195)
Finally, combining (168), (194), and (195) gives the desired lower bound on α stated in (24), namely
α > α′()− ζ (196)
> f(ρ)− Tr
[
ρT∇f(ρ)
]
+ max
(~y,~z)∈S˜∗ (ρ)
(
~˜γ · ~y − ′
n∑
i=1
zi
)
− ζ . (197)
E Tightness
In this section we show that the lower bound in Theorem 3 is tight. We want to show that as  → 0 and ′ → 0,
the minimizer ρ∗′ of f over S˜′ satisfies
β′(ρ∗′)− ζ → α (198)
where the left-hand side of (198) is the lower bound produced by Theorem 3. We state this as the following
proposition.
Proposition 1: Let ρ∗′ be the minimizer of f over S˜′ . Then
lim
,′→0
β′(ρ∗′)− ζ = α . (199)
Proof. Taking the limit of the lower bound in Theorem 3 as ′ → 0 we recover the bound in Theorem 2. That is
lim
,′→0
β′(ρ∗′)− ζ = lim
→0
β(ρ∗ )− ζ , (200)
where
ρ∗′ := arg min
ρ∈S˜′
f(ρ) (201)
ρ∗ := arg min
ρ∈S
f(ρ) , (202)
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and in (200) we used the fact that lim′→0 ρ∗′ = ρ∗ .
Now by (148)
lim
→0
β(ρ∗ )− ζ = lim
→0
α()− ζ . (203)
This gives
lim
,′→0
β′(ρ∗′)− ζ = lim
→0
α()− ζ . (204)
Finally, Lemma 9 implies that
lim
,′→0
β′(ρ∗′)− ζ = α . (205)
Thus, given suitably small , ′ it follows that the bound produced by Theorem 3 applied to a near-optimal state
is arbitrarily tight.
F Examples
F.1 Efficiency Mismatch
For the BB84 protocol with detector efficiency mismatch, we model it as an entanglement-based protocol. We write
Alice’s POVM as
PA1 = pz|0〉〈0| , PA2 = pz|1〉〈1| , PA3 = (1− pz)|+〉〈+| , PA4 = (1− pz)|−〉〈−| (206)
where {|0〉, |1〉} is the z-basis on a qubit, and |±〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 ± |1〉). Here pz denotes the probability for Alice to
measure in the z-basis. For our numerics, we chose pz ≈ 1, corresponding to using the z-basis most of the time.
We model Bob’s system as a qutrit, where the one-photon subspace is modeled as a qubit subspace, and the third
dimension is the vacuum. This third dimension is incorporated because of detector inefficiency, which may cause a
no-click event. Bob’s POVM elements associated with detecting a photon are given by
PB1 = pz|0〉〈0| ⊕ 0 , PB2 = pzη|1〉〈1| ⊕ 0 , PB3 = (1− pz)|+〉〈+| ⊕ 0 , PB4 = (1− pz)η|−〉〈−| ⊕ 0 , (207)
where the direct sum is used here to embed qubit operators inside a qutrit Hilbert space. Note that PB2 and PB4
have a factor of η due to detector inefficiency. (We assume one detector has perfect efficiency, while the other has
efficiency η.) The last of Bob’s POVM elements corresponds to a no-click event,
PB5 = 1−
4∑
j=1
PBj . (208)
To generate the constraints in (36), we simulate the data using a depolarizing channel with depolarizing proba-
bility p,
Edep(ρ) = (1− p)ρ+ p1/2 . (209)
We consider the bipartite state generated from applying this channel to half of a maximally entangled state |Φ〉,
ρsimAB = (I ⊗ Edep)(|Φ〉〈Φ|) , (210)
and we emphasize that this state is only used to simulate experimental data. To obtain the constraints in (36), we
compute
pjk = Tr((PAj ⊗ PBk )ρsimAB) . (211)
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Now consider Alice’s and Bob’s announcements. For sifting purposes, Alice announces her basis, and so (41)
becomes
KA0 =
√
PA1 ⊗ |0〉A˜ ⊗ |0〉A +
√
PA2 ⊗ |0〉A˜ ⊗ |1〉A (212)
KA1 =
√
PA3 ⊗ |1〉A˜ ⊗ |0〉A +
√
PA4 ⊗ |1〉A˜ ⊗ |1〉A . (213)
Likewise Bob announces his basis and he announces whether he got a click or not. We can model this with three
Kraus operators as follows
KB0 =
√
PB1 ⊗ |0〉B˜ ⊗ |0〉B +
√
PB2 ⊗ |0〉B˜ ⊗ |1〉B (214)
KB1 =
√
PB3 ⊗ |1〉B˜ ⊗ |0〉B +
√
PB4 ⊗ |1〉B˜ ⊗ |1〉B (215)
KB2 =
√
PB5 ⊗ |2〉B˜ ⊗ |0〉B . (216)
Next we consider the post-selection. Events where Bob does not receive a click, or where Alice and Bob use different
bases, are discarded. Hence, (44) becomes
Π = |0〉〈0|
A˜
⊗ |0〉〈0|
B˜
+ |1〉〈1|
A˜
⊗ |1〉〈1|
B˜
. (217)
Finally, consider the isometry V associated with the key map defined in (46). We can define the key map such
that Alice stores 0 (1) in her key when she obtains outcome PA1 or PA3 (PA2 or PA4 ). This gives
V = |0〉R ⊗ |0〉〈0|A + |1〉R ⊗ |1〉〈1|A , (218)
with identity acting on all other subsystems. The above expressions allow one to define G in (55), and hence define
the optimization problem.
F.2 Trojan-horse attack
We model the BB84 protocol under a Trojan-horse attack as a prepare-and-measure protocol with sifting. As
discussed in Sec. 4, we treat this by constructing the source-replacement state,
|ψ〉AA′ =
√
pz
2 |0〉|φz+〉+
√
pz
2 |1〉|φz−〉+
√
1− pz
2 |2〉|φx+〉+
√
1− pz
2 |3〉|φx−〉 (219)
where {|φz±〉, |φx±〉} are the signal states specified in (58)-(61). For high-efficiency sifting [43], we bias the proba-
bility distribution so that the z-basis is used most of the time, i.e., pz ≈ 1. Within this framework, Alice prepares
her signal states by acting with a POVM on register system A, with POVM elements
PA1 = |0〉〈0| , PA2 = |1〉〈1| , PA3 = |2〉〈2| , PA4 = |3〉〈3| . (220)
Bob measures in either the z- or x-basis via the following POVM
PB1 = pz|z+〉〈z+| , PB2 = pz|z−〉〈z−| , PB3 = (1− pz)|x+〉〈x+| , PB4 = (1− pz)|x−〉〈x−| , (221)
where for simplicity we set the pz appearing in Bob’s measurement to be the same value as that used for Alice’s
signal states.
Next we consider data simulation for the purpose of formulating the constraints in (36). We model Eve’s attack
as a depolarizing channel (209) with depolarizing probability p. (Note that p = 2Q, where Q is the error rate
plotted in Fig. 4.) Applying this channel to the state |ψ〉AA′ gives
ρsimAB = (I ⊗ Edep)(|ψ〉〈ψ|AA′) . (222)
To obtain the constraints in (36), we compute
pjk = Tr((PAj ⊗ PBk )ρsimAB) . (223)
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Since Alice’s density operator is fixed, we add the additional constraints specified by (39).
Now we consider the announcements made by Alice and Bob. Alice announces her choice of basis, so (41) becomes
KA0 =
√
PA1 ⊗ |0〉A˜ ⊗ |0〉A +
√
PA2 ⊗ |0〉A˜ ⊗ |1〉A (224)
KA1 =
√
PA3 ⊗ |1〉A˜ ⊗ |0〉A +
√
PA4 ⊗ |1〉A˜ ⊗ |1〉A . (225)
(We remark that, in this case, introducing the additional register system A is redundant since the key information
can be read off directly from system A, but we do it here for completeness.)
Similarly, Bob announces his choice of basis, so (40) becomes
KB0 =
√
PB1 ⊗ |0〉B˜ ⊗ |0〉B +
√
PB2 ⊗ |0〉B˜ ⊗ |1〉B (226)
KB1 =
√
PB3 ⊗ |1〉B˜ ⊗ |0〉B +
√
PB4 ⊗ |1〉B˜ ⊗ |1〉B . (227)
For the post-selection, Alice and Bob discard events where they measure in different bases. So (44) becomes
Π = |0〉〈0|
A˜
⊗ |0〉〈0|
B˜
+ |1〉〈1|
A˜
⊗ |1〉〈1|
B˜
. (228)
Finally, consider the isometry V associated with the key map defined in (46). We can define the key map such
that Alice stores 0 (1) in her key when she obtains outcome PA1 or PA3 (PA2 or PA4 ). This gives
V = |0〉R ⊗ |0〉〈0|A + |1〉R ⊗ |1〉〈1|A , (229)
with identity acting on all other subsystems. The above expressions allow one to define G in (55), and hence define
the optimization problem.
F.3 BB84 protocol with phase-coherent signal states
We model the BB84 protocol with phase-coherent signal states as a prepare-and-measure protocol with sifting,
similar to how we modeled the Trojan-horse attack above. We apply the source-replacement scheme as described
in Sec. 4, with the state |ψ〉AA′ from (37) given by
|ψ〉AA′ =
√
pz
2 |0〉|φz+〉+
√
pz
2 |1〉|φz−〉+
√
1− pz
2 |2〉|φx+〉+
√
1− pz
2 |3〉|φx−〉 (230)
where {|φz±〉, |φx±〉} are specified in (64)-(67). Here, pz denotes the probability of Alice preparing a state in the
z-basis, and it is biased to be close to one.
Alice’s POVM acts on the register system A with the standard basis elements, namely
PA1 = |0〉〈0| , PA2 = |1〉〈1| , PA3 = |2〉〈2| , PA4 = |3〉〈3| . (231)
By applying a squashing model [44], we model Bob’s system as a qutrit, where the one-photon subspace is
modeled as a qubit subspace, and the third dimension is the vacuum. This third dimension is incorporated because
of channel loss, which may cause a no-click event. Bob’s POVM elements are then
PB1 = pz|0〉〈0| ⊕ 0 , PB2 = pz|1〉〈1| ⊕ 0 , PB3 = (1− pz)|+〉〈+| ⊕ 0 ,
PB4 = (1− pz)|−〉〈−| ⊕ 0 , PB5 = 1−
4∑
i=1
PBi . (232)
Next we consider data simulation for the purpose of formulating the constraints in (36). We model the channel
between Alice and Bob as a lossy channel Eloss(ρ) with transmission probability η. Note that the action of this
channel on a coherent state is |α〉 → |√ηα〉. We can apply the channel to the state |ψ〉AA′ to obtain the bipartite
state
ρsimAB = (I ⊗ Eloss)(|ψ〉〈ψ|AA′) . (233)
The remainder of the model is identical to that of Sec. F.2 from (223) onwards. This defines the optimization
problem.
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